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Despite the large number of new medicines entering the market every year, the vast majority 
offer few clinical advantages for patients over existing alternatives. Governments and 
pharmaceutical companies share the responsibility for this innovation deficit in the sector.  
 
 
 
Many in the pharmaceutical sector suggest that the industry is suffering from a crisis, driven by 
a rise in the cost of developing drugs. Industry analysts fret that financial rewards are no longer 
sufficient for companies to maintain the historical rates of investment needed to develop 
clinically useful medications.1 Despite these concerns, regulators in the US and Europe granted 
marketing authorizations to a record number of new medicines in 2014. In this article, we 
consider the industry’s recent innovativeness and show that the majority of new medicines offer 
few clinical advantages over existing alternatives. We discuss how both government and 
pharmaceutical company practices contribute to the ongoing innovation deficit in the sector. To 
the extent that pharmaceutical companies have a disproportionate emphasis on marketing 
versus research, governments fail to correct this imbalance by sending coordinated and 
consistent policy signals to the industry.  
 
A paucity of clinically superior medicines 
 
Ideally, pharmaceutical companies develop new treatment alternatives for conditions with no 
current (satisfactory) remedies or drugs that offer meaningful therapeutic improvement over 
existing options. Over the past half century, the pharmaceutical industry has been responsible 
for the development of innovative medicines: significant products that transformed the 
management and treatment of diseases.2 In recent years, however, industry analysts have 
adopted several alternative definitions to measure innovation.3 These include, among others, 
pharmacological improvements related to the kinetic properties of new medicines. Today, what 
innovation means depends on the particular metric used to evaluate it (Table 1). Some of the 
commonly used definitions significantly deviate from the way innovation is understood by 
patients and clinicians: as new medicines that significantly improve health when compared to 
older alternatives.   
 
Currently, the most common approach to measure innovation is to count the number of new 
drug approvals.3 The number of drug approvals has increased over the past five decades, 
culminating in 41 approvals in the US and 40 in Europe in 2014 alone, as compared to a 50-
year average of 20 approvals per year.4,5 Large numbers of new drugs in recent years have 
been taken as a proxy for the innovative capacity of the industry.  
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Unfortunately, the recent increase in the numbers of new drugs is not necessarily indicative of 
new breakthroughs; instead, it largely reflects continued market entry of modest, relatively minor 
modifications of existing drugs.6 Studies published over the past decades evaluating the clinical 
importance of new drugs consistently report a negative trend.7-11 Regardless of differences in 
analytic approach and time period, these studies unequivocally characterize only a minority of 
new drugs as clinically superior to existing alternatives.3 According to Luijn, approximately 10% 
of 122 new medicines that entered the European market between 1999 and 2005 were deemed 
superior to drugs already on offer.12 Among the set of drugs reviewed by German authorities 
between 2012 and 2013, approximately 20% were concluded to offer significant benefit 
compared to existing alternatives and none were deemed to offer major benefit.13 Between 1990 
and 2003, only 6% of 1147 drugs approved in Canada provided a substantial improvement over 
existing drug products.14 Canadian authorities considered 10% of new drugs approved between 
2004 and 2009 as highly innovative.15  
 
Despite the paucity of clinically superior drugs, the size of the pharmaceutical market grew by a 
factor of 2.5 in real terms between 1990 and 2010 (Figure 1). Although recent estimates are not 
available, much of the increase in pharmaceutical expenditures has been due to the increasing 
investment in me-too medicines, rather than the small minority of clinically superior 
medications.14 During a period when the share of health expenditures attributable to 
pharmaceuticals consistently increased and medication affordability suffered,16,17 
pharmaceutical companies have remained profitable. Over the last 30 years, firms lost their 
number one position in the Fortune 500 only in 2003, coming third behind oil and financial 
companies. In 2012, the top five pharmaceutical companies included in the Fortune 500 earned 
over $50 billion in net profits.  
 
Inconsistent and unpredictable government regulations  
 
Substantial accountability for the innovation deficit in the sector rests with governments. A 
unique aspect of the pharmaceutical industry is the scope of regulations surrounding its 
practices. Such regulations have ensured that products entering the market are efficacious and 
safe, according to data from rigorous trials. These same regulations should also foster research, 
development, and access to innovative drugs and yet it is clear that regulatory agencies 
responsible for approving the market entry of new medications such as the FDA and EMA are 
reluctant to send the correct signals to pharmaceutical companies. For example, regulators still 
do not require comparative trials for me-too agents entering drug classes with multiple effective 
agents.18  
 
Regulators in recent years have in fact progressively lowered their evidence requirements for 
market entry of new drugs by requiring smaller trials, surrogate endpoints, and placebo 
comparisons, and increasingly adopted expedited approvals.19,20 Such rushed approvals had 
significant implications for drug safety.21,22 Several regulatory designations are aimed at 
shortening the timeline for regulatory review with the ultimate goal of making drugs available as 
rapidly as possible. A significant unintended consequence of this regulatory enthusiasm for fast 
market access of new drugs has been an estimated 35% increase in safety warnings and 
market withdrawals, with over one fourth of drugs approved since 1992 receiving black-box 
warnings or being withdrawn from the market.23 Raising the bar for market entry of new drugs, 
particularly those in established areas, would serve as a disincentive to invest in crowded areas, 
and encourage companies to concentrate on developing clinically superior drugs.5 
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Regulatory demands may even run counter to facilitating the development of better medicines. 
Inconsistency and unpredictability of expectations across international borders adds significant 
complexity to research and development (R&D) efforts in today’s global market. Notably, health 
technology assessment bodies, which serve as barriers to market entry in several countries, 
have varying evidence expectations and employ different methods for different settings.24 These 
bodies do not have a unified perception of benefit and value, and disagree on what constitutes 
clinical superiority. This means that firms need to tailor their drug applications on a market-by-
market basis, often using expensive, local contractors, and are unable to find economies of 
scale for approval activities. In the end, a particular drug may be covered in one setting but not 
in another, with substantial disparities in the recommendations issued for new drugs across 
countries with similar GDP per capita and health spending levels.25  
 
In recent years, government funding for research has stagnated (and indeed declined) and it 
has correlated only marginally with disease burden.26 Current levels of government funding for 
research disproportionately prioritize cancer over other conditions that are associated with 
significantly higher burden of disease. Although such research investments have materialized in 
new product launches over the past decade, they brought modest therapeutic benefits. Of 71 
oncology products approved between 2002 and 2014, the median gain in overall survival was 
2.1 months.27  
 
An unintended consequence of government regulations has been a significant expansion of the 
pharmaceutical market over the past decades. Policies aimed at increasing generic drug use 
have indirectly contributed to the industry’s financial success by continuing to reward me-too 
drugs rather than clinically superior medicines. Following the enactment of the Waxman-Hatch 
Act in the US in 1984, and accompanied by European measures to improve generic prescribing, 
use of generic products has risen.28 In the US, a large share of prescriptions is now for generics, 
with over $113 billion of sales substituted with generic alternatives due to patent expirations 
between 2010 and 2014. In the absence of coordinated mechanisms to identify and reward 
better medicines, generics have provided the fiscal space for governments to purchase 
expensive patented products despite the lack of evidence that brand formulations are better 
than older and cheaper alternatives. Indeed, cost reductions achieved by generic use were 
more than offset by increasing expenditure in expensive branded medications. In 2013, 
although generics accounted for over 70% of all prescription drugs used in the US, they were 
responsible for less than 30% of total drug spending. Branded formulations, on the other hand, 
accounting for only 30% of medications, were responsible for 70% of expenditures.29 In Europe, 
although generics make up almost half of volume sales, they represent less than 20% of value 
sales.30 
 
Industry’s disproportionate emphasis on marketing versus research 
 
The pharmaceutical industry shares the responsibility for the paucity of clinically superior 
medicines entering the market. Firms operate in a unique environment shaped by the risky 
nature of drug discovery; fewer than one in ten molecules that enter development receive 
approval after an average development period of 13.5 years.31 To minimize risk, industry 
continues to invest heavily in already established areas and has a disproportionate emphasis on 
marketing versus research.  
 
In the short-term, firms are under pressure to demonstrate value to their shareholders,32,33 
whose short-term interests may be at odds with the longer-term objectives of clinicians, patients 
and policy makers seeking improvements in health. Industry’s short-term goals encourage 
research on me-too products in established areas, which provide more reliable returns on 
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investment at the potential expense of breakthroughs in other areas and in breach of the implicit 
contract between firms and society.  
 
More than one drug alternative may be warranted in some therapeutic areas to allow for patient-
centred, individualised treatment options; however the industry’s overreliance on me-too drugs 
(there are >5 statins; >15 beta-blockers; and >30 anti-diabetics) cannot always be justified – 
particularly when they do not offer demonstrable quality of life, convenience, or therapeutic 
benefits in different patient sub-groups.  
 
In recent years, several large companies have allocated a disproportionate share of R&D 
expenses to late-stage development of drug candidates while neglecting pre-clinical 
discovery.31,34 These reorganisations naturally led R&D operations away from science-driven 
investigation to process-led development (Box 1).  
 
High profits in the pharmaceutical sector are not necessarily linked to better products.35,36 
Instead, it is the industry’s emphasis on marketing37 – disproportionately high compared to its 
research efforts6 – that drives prescriber and patient behaviour.38 Companies spend almost 
twice as much on promotion as they do on R&D.39 A hallmark of the marketing policy is firms’ 
ability to exert direct influence on professionals’ decisions40 and, in the US, on health 
consumers through direct to consumer advertising.41  
 
The industry understands that its sales and marketing strategy matters as much as (if not more 
than) its ability to develop clinically superior medicines.39 Particularly evident in lucrative drug 
classes, firms’ marketing strategies successfully change prescribing behaviors. A now classic 
example of this is in the statin market. Until recently, an intensive marketing campaign helped to 
ensure that the utilization rates of five statins trailed behind those of atorvastatin, despite the 
lack of comparative evidence for its superiority to existing alternatives such as simvastatin.42 
Sustained marketing of atorvastatin, even with cheaper generics available, has helped it 
become the best-selling medication in history.43 Similarly, a successful marketing campaign for 
esomeprazole, a repackaged version of an older product, generated over $35 billion in revenue 
between 2006 and 2013.44 
 
Way forward 
 
Improving the drug development process will require a reconfiguration of system-wide 
incentives. Collective, concerted regulatory action is needed to send the correct signals to 
pharmaceutical companies. Policy options are several and include the identification of priority 
therapeutic areas for which R&D could be made more economically attractive. In other areas 
such as antibiotics, public-private partnerships, advance market commitments, extended 
marketing exclusivity or risk-sharing policies could be designed to share the risk of financing 
early-stage research. To encourage competition and deter industry-wide consolidation, 
governments could more closely monitor monopolistic behavior in certain therapeutic areas. 
 
Finally, pricing and reimbursement policies should reward clinically superior medicines and not 
me-too drugs.54 Current spending on me-too medications distorts the calculus of industry’s R&D 
activity. By preferentially reimbursing drugs that offer clinically meaningful improvements over 
existing alternatives, governments could encourage true breakthroughs.55 Countries should 
send a coordinated signal to the industry independently of their differing approaches to 
regulation. Instituting stricter evidence requirements at the time of market entry and requiring 
evidence of clinical effectiveness in robust trials would be an important first step.   
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Conclusion 
 
Patients and clinicians are faced with a paucity of clinically superior medicines. In a convoluted 
global policy environment where regulatory structures coax firms to engage in innovative sales 
and marketing practices rather than in innovative science, future efforts should focus on 
streamlining the policy environment surrounding the industry and reward the development of 
clinically superior medicines. 
 
Key Messages 
 
 Government practices contribute to the innovation deficit in the pharmaceutical sector: low 
bar for market entry of new products; stagnating investment in R&D; and inconsistency and 
unpredictability of regulatory expectations and incentive structures across international 
borders. 
 Industry practices share the responsibility for the paucity of clinically superior drugs: 
disproportionate emphasis on marketing versus research; continued investment in already 
established areas; and a declining appetite for risky research.  
 Concerted regulatory action is needed at the international level to incentivize and reward the 
development of clinically superior medicines, not me-too drugs.  
 
 
Contributors and sources 
 
All authors are actively engaged in academic research on the pharmaceutical sector. HN and 
EM have written several articles on pharmaceutical policy and regulation in the EU and the US. 
EM has extensive experience of European health systems and regulatory policies through his 
involvement with the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. EM, HN, and AC 
devised the article. HN and AC wrote the first draft. EM contributed to subsequent drafts. All 
have read and agreed to the final version. HN is guarantor. 
 
The authors thank the peer reviewers of this article (Professors Donald Light and James 
Raftery) for their helpful comments and suggestions.  
 
 
Conflicts of Interest 
 
We declare no conflicts of interest.  
 
Licence to publish 
 
The Corresponding Author has the right to grant on behalf of all authors and does grant on 
behalf of all authors, an exclusive licence (or non exclusive for government employees) on a 
worldwide basis to the BMJ Publishing Group Ltd to permit this article (if accepted) to be 
published in BMJ and any other BMJPGL products and sublicences such use and exploit all 
subsidiary rights, as set out in our licence (http://group.bmj.com/products/journals/instructions-
for-authors/licence-forms). 
 
References 
 
6 
 
1. Berndt ER, Nass D, Kleinrock M, Aitken M. Decline In Economic Returns From New 
Drugs Raises Questions About Sustaining Innovations. Health Affairs. 2015;34(2):245-
252. 
2. Kesselheim AS, Avorn J. The most transformative drugs of the past 25 years: a survey 
of physicians. Nature reviews. Drug discovery. 2013;12(6):425-431. 
3. Kesselheim AS, Wang B, Avorn J. Defining “innovativeness” in drug development: a 
systematic review. Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics. 2013;94(3):336-348. 
4. Munos B. Lessons from 60 years of pharmaceutical innovation. Nature reviews. Drug 
discovery. 2009;8(12):959-968. 
5. Naci H, Cylus J, Vandoros S, Sato A, Perampaladas K. Raising the bar for market 
authorisation of new drugs. Bmj. 2012;345:e4261. 
6. Light DW, Lexchin JR. Pharmaceutical research and development: what do we get for all 
that money. BMJ. 2012;345(1):e4348-e4348. 
7. Ward DJ, Martino OI, Simpson S, Stevens AJ. Decline in new drug launches: myth or 
reality? Retrospective observational study using 30 years of data from the UK. BMJ 
Open. 2013;3(2). 
8. Garattini S. Efficacy, safety, and cost of new anticancer drugs. BMJ: British Medical 
Journal. 2002;325(7358):269. 
9. Garattini S, Bertele V. Efficacy, safety and cost of new drugs acting on the central 
nervous system. European journal of clinical pharmacology. 2003;59(1):79-84. 
10. Garattini S. Efficacy, safety and cost of new cardiovascular drugs: a survey. European 
journal of clinical pharmacology. 2003;59(8-9):701-706. 
11. Barbui C, Cipriani A, Lintas C, Bertelé V, Garattini S. CNS drugs approved by the 
centralised European procedure: true innovation or dangerous stagnation? 
Psychopharmacology. 2007;190(2):265-268. 
12. van Luijn JC, Gribnau FW, Leufkens HG. Superior efficacy of new medicines? European 
journal of clinical pharmacology. 2010;66(5):445-448. 
13. Ruof J, Schwartz F, Schulenburg JM, Dintsios C-M. Early benefit assessment (EBA) in 
Germany: analysing decisions 18 months after introducing the new AMNOG legislation. 
Eur J Health Econ. 2014;15(6):577-589. 
14. Morgan SG, Bassett KL, Wright JM, et al. “Breakthrough” drugs and growth in 
expenditure on prescription drugs in Canada. Vol 3312005. 
15. Lexchin J. International comparison of assessments of pharmaceutical innovation. 
Health policy. 2012;105(2):221-225. 
16. Naci H, Soumerai SB, Ross-Degnan D, et al. Medication affordability gains following 
Medicare Part D are eroding among elderly with multiple chronic conditions. Health 
Affairs. 2014;33(8):1435-1443. 
17. Wilensky G. A new focus on prescription drug spending. JAMA. 2015;314(5):440-441. 
18. Mossialos E, Mrazek M, Walley T. Regulating Pharmaceuticals In Europe: Striving For 
Efficiency, Equity And Quality: Striving for Efficiency, Equity and Quality. McGraw-Hill 
International; 2004. 
19. Belleli R, Fisch R, Szucs TD. Regulatory watch: Efficiency indicators for new drugs 
approved by the FDA from 2003 to 2013. Nature reviews. Drug discovery. 
2015;14(3):156-156. 
20. Kesselheim AS, Wang B, Franklin JM, Darrow JJ. Trends in utilization of FDA expedited 
drug development and approval programs, 1987-2014: cohort study. BMJ. 2015;351. 
21. Light DW, Lexchin J. Why do cancer drugs get such an easy ride? Vol 3502015. 
22. Light DW, Lexchin J. The FDA’s new clothes. BMJ. 2015;351. 
23. Frank C, Himmelstein DU, Woolhandler S, et al. Era of faster FDA drug approval has 
also seen increased black-box warnings and market withdrawals. Health Affairs. 
2014;33(8):1453-1459. 
7 
 
24. Chalkidou K, Tunis S, Lopert R, et al. Comparative Effectiveness Research and 
Evidencenceeen Health Policy: Experience from Four Countries. Milbank Quarterly. 
2009;87(2):339-367. 
25. Nicod E, Kanavos P. Commonalities and differences in HTA outcomes: A comparative 
analysis of five countries and implications for coverage decisions. Health Policy. 
2012;108(2):167-177. 
26. Moses H, Matheson DH, Cairns-Smith S, George BP, Palisch C, Dorsey ER. The 
anatomy of medical research: US and international comparisons. JAMA. 
2015;313(2):174-189. 
27. Fojo T, Mailankody S, Lo A. Unintended Consequences of Expensive Cancer 
Therapeutics—The Pursuit of Marginal Indications and a Me-Too Mentality That Stifles 
Innovation and Creativity: The John Conley Lecture. JAMA Otolaryngology–Head & 
Neck Surgery. 2014;140(12):1225-1236. 
28. Kesselheim AS. An empirical review of major legislation affecting drug development: 
past experiences, effects, and unintended consequences. Milbank Quarterly. 
2011;89(3):450-502. 
29. IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics. A Review of the Use of Medicines in the U.S. in 
2013.  
http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/imshealth/menuitem.762a961826aad98f53c753c71
ad8c22a/?vgnextoid=a56c50b62d055410VgnVCM10000076192ca2RCRD. Accessed 
July 30, 2014. 
30. Sheppard A. Generic medicines: Essential contributors to the long term health of society. 
IMS Health. 2010. 
31. Paul SM, Mytelka DS, Dunwiddie CT, et al. How to improve R&D productivity: the 
pharmaceutical industry's grand challenge. Nature reviews. Drug discovery. 
2010;9(3):203-214. 
32. Dukes M. Accountability of the pharmaceutical industry. The Lancet. 
2002;360(9346):1682-1684. 
33. The Pharmaceutical Industry — To Whom is It Accountable? New England Journal of 
Medicine. 2000;343(19):1415-1417. 
34. Garnier J-P. Rebuilding the R&D engine in big pharma. Harvard Business Review. 
2008;86(5):68-70, 72-66, 128. 
35. Demirel P, Mazzucato M. Does market selection reward innovators? R&D, patents and 
growth in the US pharmaceutical industry. London, Open University, IKD working Paper. 
2008;33. 
36. Kessler DA, Rose JL, Temple RJ, Schapiro R, Griffin JP. Therapeutic-class wars--drug 
promotion in a competitive marketplace. New England Journal of Medicine. 
1994;331(20):1350-1353. 
37. Kornfield R, Donohue J, Berndt ER, Alexander GC. Promotion of Prescription Drugs to 
Consumers and Providers, 2001–2010. PLoS ONE. 2013;8(3):e55504. 
38. Mintzes B, Barer ML, Kravitz RL, et al. How does direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) 
affect prescribing? A survey in primary care environments with and without legal DTCA. 
Canadian Medical Association Journal. 2003;169(5):405-412. 
39. Gagnon M-A, Lexchin J. The cost of pushing pills: a new estimate of pharmaceutical 
promotion expenditures in the United States. PLoS Medicine. 2008;5(1):e1. 
40. Spurling GK, Mansfield PR, Montgomery BD, et al. Information from Pharmaceutical 
Companies and the Quality, Quantity, and Cost of Physicians' Prescribing: A Systematic 
Review. PLoS Med. 2010;7(10):e1000352. 
41. Stamatakis E, Weiler R, Ioannidis JPA. Undue industry influences that distort healthcare 
research, strategy, expenditure and practice: a review. European Journal of Clinical 
Investigation. 2013;43(5):469-475. 
8 
 
42. Naci H, Brugts JJ, Fleurence R, Ades A. Dose-comparative effects of different statins on 
serum lipid levels: a network meta-analysis of 256,827 individuals in 181 randomized 
controlled trials. European Journal of Preventive Cardiology. 2013. 
43. Green JB, Ross JS, Jackevicius CA, Shah ND, Krumholz HM. When choosing statin 
therapy: the case for generics. JAMA internal medicine. 2013;173(3):229-232. 
44. Statista. AstraZeneca's revenue from top product Nexium from 2006 to 2013. 2014; 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/266545/astrazenecas-revenue-from-top-product-
nexium-since-2006/. Accessed July 29, 2014. 
45. Rafols I, Hopkins MM, Hoekman J, et al. Big Pharma, little science?: A bibliometric 
perspective on Big Pharma's R&amp;D decline. Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change. 2014;81(0):22-38. 
46. Mazzucato M. The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. 
London: Anthem Press; 2013. 
47. Higgins MJ, Rodriguez D. The outsourcing of R&D through acquisitions in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Journal of Financial Economics. 2006;80(2):351-383. 
48. Ravenscraft DJ, Long WF. Paths to creating value in pharmaceutical mergers. Mergers 
and Productivity: University of Chicago Press; 2000:287-326. 
49. Danzon PM, Epstein A, Nicholson S. Mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical 
and biotech industries. Managerial and Decision Economics. 2007;28(4l and Decisio50.
 Ornaghi C. Mergers and innovation in big pharma. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization. 2009;27(1):70-79. 
51. Kanavos P, Angelis A. Acquiring Pharmaceutical Industry Assets in the UK: 1 + 1 = 1? 
Pharmaceutical Medicine. 2014;28(5):245-248. 
52. Comanor WS, Scherer FM. Mergers and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Journal of health economics. 2013;32(1):106-113. 
53. LaMattina JL. The impact of mergers on pharmaceutical R&D. Nature Reviews Drug 
Discovery. 2011;10(8):559-560. 
54. Jayadev A, Stiglitz J. Two Ideas To Increase Innovation And Reduce Pharmaceutical 
Costs And Prices. Health Affairs. 2009;28(1):w165-w168. 
55. Hwang TJ, Carpenter D, Kesselheim AS. Paying for innovation: Reimbursement 
incentives for antibiotics. Science Translational Medicine. 2015;7(276):276fs279. 
 
  
9 
 
Table 1. Primary categories of measures used to define and evaluate innovation in the 
pharmaceutical sector 
Category Description 
Number of new 
drug approvals 
In a recent systematic review of the literature, Kesselheim and 
colleagues identified drug counts as the most common metric used to 
evaluate the innovativeness of the pharmaceutical sector.1 Regulators 
(e.g., Food and Drug Administration and European Medicines Agency), 
pharmaceutical companies and policymakers often refer to the number 
of new drug approvals to indicate the health of the pharmaceutical 
research and development pipeline.2  
Technological and 
pharmacological 
novelties 
Studies evaluating innovation on the basis of therapeutic and 
pharmacological characteristics of new medicines often focus on 
pharmacokinetic novelties, which may or may not be associated with 
clinical improvements.3, 4  
Number of patents 
associated with 
new medicines 
As a measure of innovativeness, researchers previously investigated the 
number of patents granted to new medicines and the number of 
subsequent citations of such patents.5  
Degree of clinical 
superiority of new 
medicines over 
existing 
alternatives 
Patients, clinicians, and wider society often equate new with better, and 
expect new medicines to be clinically superior to existing alternatives in 
terms of important and relevant outcomes. Studies evaluating innovation 
in terms of clinical superiority used various surrogate, clinical, quality-of-
life, and safety endpoints to measure the extent to which new medicines 
offer advantages over older alternatives.6-10 
Sources for the table: 
1.
 Kesselheim AS, Wang B, Avorn J. Defining “innovativeness” in drug development: a systematic 
review. Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics. 2013;94(3):336-348. 
2.
 Ward DJ, Slade A, Genus T, Martino OI, Stevens AJ. How innovative are new drugs launched in the 
UK? A retrospective study of new drugs listed in the British National Formulary (BNF) 2001–2012. 
BMJ open. 2014;4(10):e006235. 
3.
 Motola D, De Ponti F, Rossi P, Martini N, Montanaro N. Therapeutic innovation in the European 
Union: analysis of the drugs approved by the EMEA between 1995 and 2003. British journal of clinical 
pharmacology. 2005;59(4):475-478. 
4.
 Motola D, De Ponti F, Poluzzi E, et al. An update on the first decade of the European centralized 
procedure: how many innovative drugs? British journal of clinical pharmacology. 2006;62(5):610-616. 
5.
 Kesselheim AS, Avorn J. Using patent data to assess the value of pharmaceutical innovation. J. Law. 
Med. Ethics. 2009;37:176–183. 
6.
 Morgan SG, Bassett KL, Wright JM, Evans RG, Barer ML, Caetano PA, et al. “Breakthrough” drugs 
and growth in expenditure on prescription drugs in Canada BMJ. 2005;53(15):815-6. 
7.
 Barbui C, Cipriani A, Lintas C, Bertelé V, Garattini S. CNS drugs approved by the centralised 
European procedure: true innovation or dangerous stagnation? Psychopharmacology. 
2007;190(2):265-8. 
8.
 Garattini S. Efficacy, safety and cost of new cardiovascular drugs: a survey. European journal of 
clinical pharmacology. 2003;59(8-9):701-6. 
9.
 Garattini S, Bertele V. Efficacy, safety and cost of new drugs acting on the central nervous system. 
European journal of clinical pharmacology. 2003;59(1):79-84. 
10.
 van Luijn JC, Gribnau FW, Leufkens HG. Superior efficacy of new medicines? European journal of 
clinical pharmacology. 2010;66(5):445-8. 
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Figure 1. Growth in total health care expenditures and concurrent pharmaceutical drug 
expenditures in selected OECD countries between 1990 and 2010. Pharmaceutical expenditure 
growth is also presented as annual factor increases a,b,c,d  
 
Notes:
 a 
Real*
 
growth in total health expenditure (US$ billions, PPP) and annual factor increase from 
1990 (baseline) in pharmaceutical expenditure, as denoted by bubble size, between 1990 and 2010 (5 
year periods) for selected OECD countries: Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.  
b 
Real pharmaceutical expenditures (US$ billions, PPP) are provided within bubbles. 
c 
Sources: Authors’ own analysis based on OECD Health Database, 2014 for Australia, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Source for Canada: the 
Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2013. Sources for United States: Catlin et al. (2007) and Martin 
et al. (2012), years 1991-2005 (excl. 1990, 2000) and 1990, 2000, 2007-2010, respectively.  
d 
Greece: Total health expenditure data for 2008 obtained from WHO National Health Accounts Database, 
2014. Pharmaceutical expenditure data used for 2010 is next nearest year, 2011.   
* Deflated at average rate of 2.4% for all years (2011 base year) 
Sources for the United States:  
Catlin A, Cowan C, Heffler S, Washington B. National health spending in 2005: the slowdown continues. 
Health affairs (Project Hope). Jan-Feb 2007;26(1):142-153. 
Martin AB, Lassman D, Washington B, Catlin A. Growth in US health spending remained slow in 2010; 
health share of gross domestic product was unchanged from 2009. Health affairs (Project Hope). Jan 
2012;31(1):208-219. 
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Box 1. New Big Pharma: Industry’s declining appetite for risky research  
A recent analysis showed that the total number of scientific publications by large pharmaceutical 
companies declined while the number of external collaborations increased.
45
 Firms are increasingly 
outsourcing their R&D operations and creating partnerships for more beneficial risk-sharing, cost 
reduction and to optimize the clinical trial process.  
The shift away from science-driven investigation to process-led drug development highlights the 
industry’s declining appetite for risky drug discovery. This new business model is focused on identifying, 
acquiring, and promoting promising molecules created by smaller firms that are often financed by public 
funds.
46
  
Many large pharmaceutical firms increasingly resort to acquiring promising drug candidates from smaller 
competitors that have products in late-phase development.
31
 Hence, underperforming companies – firms 
with a high ‘desperation index’
47
 – are increasingly “buying drugs on Wall Street rather than in the 
research lab.”
48,49
 By acquiring development pipelines in familiar areas, companies are able to secure a 
steady stream of short-term revenues from promising drugs.  
The pervasive belief that consolidation equates to the development of clinically superior medicines is not 
backed by either theory or evidence.
50
 Economic theory suggests that decreasing the number of 
companies would decrease competition, in turn impeding individual firms’ capacity to develop clinically 
superior drugs. Cuts in R&D investment following such mergers and acquisitions (Figure), which are 
often aimed at achieving efficiency and economies of scale, result in the loss of two essential conditions 
for breakthroughs: the existence of independent research groups (fewer researchers now work in 
laboratories) and diverse R&D portfolios.
51
 The resulting loss of the “parallel paths”
52
 of research – the 
pursuit of multiple approaches to addressing the same research question
53
 – leads to a reduction in the 
number of breakthrough drugs that reach patients. 
 
Figure. Reductions in R&D budgets after acquisition as a percent of the acquired company’s R&D budget 
before acquisition. Figure shows the R&D reductions for the five largest acquisitions since 2005, ordered 
according to the percentage reduction of R&D. 
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Notes: Author’s analysis using DataStream 5.1 (Thomson Reuters).  
“Pre” denotes the research and development budgets (in US$ billions) of acquired and acquiring 
companies during the year before the takeover. “Post” denotes the research and development budget (in 
US$ billions) of the combined company during the year following the takeover. All costs are in 2010 US$, 
adjusted using CPI (available on http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl) 
Sensitivity analysis evaluated taking the average of the research and development budgets for two years 
following the acquisition, which did not change the overall figure materially. Another sensitivity analysis 
evaluated the counterfactual research and development budgets of separate companies if they did not 
merge, assuming that the linear rate of budget growth in the five years prior to the acquisition would 
continue during the year of the deal making.  
 
 
